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New patterns of migration between Senegal and Europe

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From Senegal and Back (1975-2008):
Trends and Routes of Migrants in Times of Restrictions

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Abstract: Since the mid-1970s, sub-Saharan candidates for migration to Europe have been confronted with increasingly stiff policy measures. This chapter explores how migration between Senegal and Europe has evolved in this context. Taking advantage of the retrospective nature of the data from the MAFE project (Migration between Africa and Europe) in addition to other available sources, it offers a unique quantitative account of the history of Senegalese migration. The results show that, between 1975 and 2008, there was neither a surge in out-migration (despite the widespread belief in an African invasion in Europe) nor the decline that might have been expected if restrictions had been effective. In fact, results tend in many ways to support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of restrictive policies is hampered by a number of unintended effects due to the ability of (would-be) migrants to adapt to new rules. Among these unintended effects are: the decline in intentions to return from Europe, the increase in attempts to migrate to Europe and the growth of irregular migration.

1. Introduction

At the turn of the 21st century, public opinion in Europe expressed great concern about sub-Saharan migration: media images of migrants assaulting the Spanish Ceuta and Melilla enclaves in Morocco and of packed pirogues barely arriving on the Spanish coasts raised fears of "invasion". Senegalese migration was closely linked in the public imagination to these images of desperate migrants flooding into Europe. Many pirogues did depart from Senegal and its close neighbours, Mauritania and Gambia. But despite the power of frightening images of migrants dying or fighting at Europe's borders, previous research has shown that the feared invasion is nothing but a myth: Sub-Saharans form a minority of migrant stocks and flows in Europe, even when estimates of irregular migration are included (de Haas 2008; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009).

This chapter brings new evidence on the migration patterns of one group – the Senegalese – that somehow embodies this fear of African migration. Using the retrospective survey data from the Migrations between Africa and Europe project (MAFE), complemented by other available statistical sources, we reconstruct the recent history of Senegalese migration. The period of interest in this chapter (1975-2008) covers what can be considered a period of increasingly restrictive European immigration policies. Historically, labour migration from Senegal mainly targeted France, though other African countries were also destinations. In 1974, France decided to stop this. In this chapter we analyze how Senegalese migration has evolved in a context of growing restrictions, not only in France but also in the rest of Europe. Without analyzing – strictly speaking – the effects of immigration policies, we test the hypothesis put forward by de Haas (2011) that the effectiveness of stiffening policies is hampered by a number of "substitution effects", whereby migrants adapt their behaviour in the face of restrictions, to finally realize their migration projects.

Taking advantage of the richness and originality of the MAFE household and biographic surveys[1], the chapter examines several aspects of migration patterns that are overshadowed in studies using conventional data such as censuses or official data on immigration flows. After this introduction, section 2 provides an analysis of trends in departure and return. Section 3 studies the changing geography of Senegalese migration, looking at the influence of both policies and migrants' social networks in destination countries. Section 4 is dedicated to what we call "the frustrated desires of migration", a notion that covers both migration "attempts" (or rather steps taken towards migration) and the experience of irregular migrants. Finally, section 5 concludes the chapter by summing up its results and discussing the relevance of the "substitution effects" hypothesis in the context of Senegalese migration.

2. Leaving, returning (1975-2008)

2.1.   A short history of migration out of Senegal

The contemporaneous history of international migration in Senegal starts in the early 20th century. From that time, out-migration followed two directions: Europe, especially France, and other sub-

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[1] Data sources of all statistics are presented below the figures and tables. All results are weighted. Readers should bear in mind that the samples used in the analyses vary from one table or graph to another, which can substantially affect the results interpretation. For more information see Chapter 2, which provides all details on MAFE samples.

Saharan countries. Historically, international migration first developed in the Senegal River Valley along the border with Mali and Mauritania. According to Tall and Tandian (2011), migration was reported as early as 1900 among the Soninke and from about 1910 among the Tukolor (Halpulaar). A culture of migration developed among the people of North and East Senegal, as a strategy to break out of economic isolation in this landlocked region excluded from development under colonialism and since (Sakho, 2005; Tall & Tandian, 2011). The introduction of monetary taxes by the French colonial administration encouraged temporary migration to places where migrants could earn wages and so pay their taxes. They moved either to groundnut plantations within Senegal or out of Senegal, towards other French colonies in West and Central Africa, such as Côte d'Ivoire or Gabon, where they worked in the administration, in trade or building railways[2]. At the same time, migration to Europe was initiated by recruitment to the French merchant marine (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2004). World War I gave a new momentum to out-migration. Senegalese soldiers in the French army left to fight in Europe. Some remained there and were followed, after the war, by migrants answering a call for labour in Metropolitan France, where reconstruction was under way[3]. Around 1925, poor harvests coinciding with a tax increase prompted many to leave in search of a cash income (Tall & Tandian, 2011). In the 1950s, small Senegalese communities became established in a number of African cities (Bredeloup 2007).

During World War II, battalions of *tirailleurs sénégalais* fought again in Europe. After the war, recruitment to the French merchant marine continued and some Senegalese migrants settled in French port cities such as Marseille, le Havre, Dunkirk Bordeaux, Toulon (Manchuelle 1997). Most importantly, the reconstruction economic boom in France prompted authorities to establish recruitment offices in the Senegal River Valley in the 1950s, in order to hire temporary workers for France's flourishing industries (mainly automobiles, textiles and hotels). Circular migration was the norm, with Senegalese migrants remaining in France only a few years before coming back to resettle in their origin country: migration was predominantly conceived as a family strategy to provide the origin community with funds (Barou 1993; Guilmoto 1998). This recruitment policy was maintained after Senegal's independence in 1960 and was facilitated by special agreements between the newly independent country and its former metropolis. As early as 1960, a treaty (*Convention d'établissement*) established a bilateral freedom of entry and residence and free exercise of economic activities for Senegalese and French citizens. This was confirmed in a bilateral treaty signed by France and Senegal in 1964 (Vickstrom 2013). Until 1974, date of a new bilateral agreement, Senegalese migrants were thus exempted from residence permits and tourist visas. Exemption from the latter was even maintained until 1986 (Mezger 2012). France thus became a major destination for Senegalese migrants who responded to the call for labour. At the same time, migration to other African countries remained high. The cocoa and coffee boom in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the petroleum boom in Gabon and the emerging diamond trade in Central Africa (Congo and Zaire) enhanced inter-African migration throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Bredeloup 2007).

Conditions in Senegalese destination countries changed dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. On one hand, France officially put an end to labour migration in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. At the end of the 1970s, measures were implemented to encourage return and further restrictions on immigration

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[2] On the role of colonial taxes in the development of migration in West Africa, see S. Amin (1974) and D. Cordell et al. (1996).
[3] In 1919, the French Minister for Agriculture and Supplies suggested recruiting migrant workers from the colonies (declaration of the Minister for Agriculture and Supplies, *Journal Officiel*, parliamentary debates, 29 January 1919).

were imposed, firstly regarding students and later (in the late 1980s) family reunification (Mezger 2012). In the 1990s and 2000s, Italy and Spain started to attract Senegalese migrants. While there is some speculation that the first Senegalese immigrants to these countries were attracted by extensive regularization programs[4] (Kaag 2008; Fall 2005; Tall 2008), both Spain and Italy adopted increasingly restrictive approaches to immigration through the 1990s and 2000s (see section 3). On the other hand, African destinations became less attractive: economic slowdown in the 1980s and political conflicts in the following decade were coupled with a rise in xenophobia in various former destinations of Senegalese migrants (Blion and Bredeloup 1997; Tall 2002).

At the same time, Senegal was facing major economic difficulties. A series of droughts, especially severe between 1978 and 1983, hurt the agricultural sector, which was furthermore hit by the collapse of the world market for peanuts, Senegal's main agricultural product since colonial times. In order to reduce the country's debt, in the 1980s and 1990s Senegalese governments agreed to implement the structural adjustment plans supported by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. This period of drastic economic liberalization did not produce the expected results: urban poverty was aggravated and economic growth remained much lower than the world average (Duruflé 1988; Mezger 2012). Downsizing in the public sector especially affected Dakar, the capital city. Social unrest was emblematized by student strikes in 1988 and 1993 that led to the government cancelling entire study years. According to qualitative studies, this prompted some students whose education was interrupted to migrate, mainly to Italy (Tandian, 2008; Riccio, 2005). Although the devaluation of the CFA franc (Senegal's currency) in 1994 generated an economic recovery (with a moderate increase in GDP per capita and a fall in urban poverty), most of the Senegalese population did not perceive any positive change in their well-being (Mezger 2012). The next sections show how international migration evolved in this context combining crisis in the origin country and border closure in destination countries.

2.2. No surge in out-migration at the turn of the 21st century

International migration in Senegal became a major subject of research in the 1990s and 2000s. In a review of the abundant literature, Lessault and Flahaux (2014) found that most of this research was based on regional and qualitative approaches and, overall, painted a contradictory picture of out-migration. While some authors stressed the rise of out-migration to Europe, other authors qualified this view of a Senegalese exodus, insisting on the significance of inter-African migration and circulation. Using two sets of nationally representative data, Lessault and Flahaux (2014) put an end to this contradictory picture of migration trends in Senegal. Comparison of the 2002 Census and the 1992 Survey on Migration and Urbanization (EMUS, *Enquête sur les migrations et l'urbanisation*) does indeed show that the propensity to out-migrate remained stable between 1992 and 2002, at a level of 7 recent migrants (out of Senegal since less than 5 years, Table 1) per 1000 inhabitants within the country (Lessault and Flahaux 2014). Other data confirm the same pattern. At the country level, the data on international migrant stocks assembled by the World Bank confirm that international out-migration stalled at the turn of the 21st century: the total number of Senegalese migrants in the world

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[4] Italy regularized 217,000 migrants in 1998, 650,000 in 2002 and 350,000 in 2006; Spain regularized 200,000 migrants in 2000, 230,000 in 2001 and 580,000 in 2005. Note that Sub-Saharans were a small minority among the regularized migrants: in Italy, 14% in 1998 and 5% in 2002; in Spain, 14% in 2000 and 6% in 2001. France regularized 80,000 migrants in 1997-1998 and 7,000 migrants in 2006, in addition to 122,000 migrants who were regularized through a case-by-case procedure between 1999 and 2006. Sub-Saharan migrants represented 40% of those regularized in France in 1997-1998 and 31% in 1999-2006. Sources: Lessault and Beauchemin (2009) and Kraler (2009).

increased slightly between 1990 and 2000, but at a much slower pace than in the previous decades (Table 2).

However, national figures mask regional specificities: while international migration tended to diminish in the old regions of out-migration (e.g. the Senegal River Valley), it grew, albeit moderately, in other areas such as Dakar, the capital city, with a rate increasing from 6 to 9 recent migrants per 1,000 Dakar residents (Table 1). The MAFE data suggest rather that the propensity to migrate internationally out of Dakar remained constant over time (Figure 1)[5]. In any case, statistics agree in showing that there was no sudden exodus out of Dakar or more generally out of Senegal, even in the 2000s when media attention was captivated by pirogues loaded with sub-Saharan migrants reaching the Spanish coasts. That this stalling of out-migration (rather than an increase) is due to restrictions in immigration policies in Europe is not impossible, but is not clearly attested. In any case and at all times, for migrants from Dakar, Europe happened to be more attractive than other countries: in the 2000s, the rate of departure to Europe was twice as high as the rate of departure to the rest of Africa.

Table 1. Recent Out-Migration from Senegal and Dakar (1992-2002)

|		1992	2002
Number of recent out-migrants*		120,575	159,958
Rate of out-migration*	Senegal	0.7%	0.7%
	Dakar	0.6%	0.9%
Percentage of migrants living in Europe	Senegal	44%	48%
	Dakar	57%	61%
Percentage of migrants living in North America	Senegal	2%	7%
	Dakar	5%	13%
Percentage of migrants living in West Africa	Senegal	40%	23%
	Dakar	27%	11%
Sources: 2002 Census and 1992 Survey on Migration and Urbanization (EMUS, *Enquête sur les migrations et l'urbanisation*), computed by Lessault and Flahaux (2014). * Definitions: - Recent migrants are persons declared by households as former household members who have been living abroad for less than 5 years at the time of the survey /census. All figures in the table relate to recent out-migrants. - The rate of out-migration is the number of recent out-migrants as a percentage of the population of the Country / the Dakar region.			

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[5] Note that the migration trends (departure and return) presented in this chapter are somewhat different from those presented in Flahaux et al. (2013), who used a different computation method. For a presentation of the method used in this book, see Chapter 3. And for a deeper methodological discussion of trend computation using retrospective data, see Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2014).

Table 2. Number of Senegalese international migrants in the World (1960-2000).
Countries with more than 5,000 Senegalese immigrants in 2000*

		1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
World**		79,598	127,443	213,314	313,544	335,948
African countries	Gambia	19,077	23,284	40,150	68,127	98,366
	Mauritania	7,544	12,615	21,095	36,662	40,517
	Côte,d'Ivoire	10,550	16,310	20,916	21,962	24,478
	Gabon	1,121	2,770	5,194	9,585	14,586
	Mali	15,258	14,978	14,703	14,433	11,380
	Congo,,Dem.,Rep.	6	24,265	15,268	10,551	8,638
	Guinea-Bissau	5,734	6,028	6,337	6,669	6,407
	Total**	59,290	100,250	123,663	167,989	204,372
Western countries	France	2,183	5,231	53,476	70,016	3,682*
	Italy	583	893	3,888	42,592	49,590
	Germany	734	826	723	1,202	17,526
	USA	116	344	948	2,786	10,262
	United,Kingdom	250	914	1,837	137	9,530
	Spain	-	-	-	720	9,192
	Total**	3,866	8,208	60,872	117,453	99,782

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database, Last Updated: 06/28/2011. Retrieved from the MAFE Contextual Database.
* The number of Senegalese migrants in France in 2000 seems to have been misreported in the Global Bilateral Migration Database. In line with the French Census data, the OECD database (DIOC) counts 54 000 Senegalese migrants in France in 2000 (see also Figure 3).
** The number of Senegalese migrants in the world is the one reported by the World Bank, without correction for any possible misreporting at the country level.

Figure 1. Departure trends. Lifetime probability of migration from Senegal, by destination (1975-2008).

Data: MAFE-Senegal, Household data, 2008.
Note: weighted figures, 90% confidence intervals.
Population: Children of households heads, aged 18-39. Migration only measured at 18 or over.
Interpretation: Each bar represents those who left Senegal as a proportion of those who were living there during the period in question.

2.3. Returns

Differences between Europe and Africa are also striking as regards return migration registered in the Dakar region: the probability to returning to Senegal is much higher for migrants who moved within the continent than for those who went to Europe (Figure 2). In short, since the mid 1970s, out-

migration to Europe has been more common and return from there less frequent. There are many reasons to explain the apparent appeal of Europe. It could be basically related to the wide difference between economic conditions in Africa and Europe: earnings, living conditions, social benefits, etc. could explain why migrants tend to prefer to head to European destinations rather than other African countries and to remain there for the same reason. This explanation fits the neo-classical theory of migration determinants quite well (see Chapter 4). It could be also that there is a process of initial selection into migration, with migrants intending to return more likely to move to neighbouring destinations, while those who aim to move for good would prefer Europe[6]. There might also be a policy explanation. Even though circulation is not entirely free on the African continent, immigration is clearly less controlled in most African countries than in Europe, and this observation applies especially to Senegal, which is involved in the free movement protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Previous research has shown that tighter control is associated with less return (Flahaux 2014; Massey et al. 2002): when the cost of departure is high, migrants already at destination tend to delay or avoid returning because they know a new departure would be difficult if not impossible in case of failure in their project of reintegration at home. This mechanism is viewed by de Haas (2011) as one of the possible substitution effects (called "reverse-flow substitution") that can limit the effectiveness of restrictive immigration policies (in that the decrease in return tends to limit the impact of restrictions on *net* migration).

The fact that destination countries develop policies to promote return (from pay-to-go programs to deportation) when they adopt a restrictive approach to migration is never mentioned in the literature as a factor that significantly increases rates of return: the number of "managed" migrants is too small, most of the return flow consisting of "spontaneous" migrants who decide to move on their own. Indeed, when asked in the MAFE biographic survey about the motives for their return, migrants back in Senegal mainly reported family reasons (34%), the second most frequent reason being the completion of their studies (15%). Returns linked to "problems with legal status" concerned just 11% of returnees from Europe. Not all of these were expulsions: respondents' detailed answers show that some undocumented migrants decide to return home on their own initiative (Flahaux et al. 2014)[7]. Furthermore, there is also some evidence from the MAFE data suggesting that forced returns are followed by new departures to Europe. On the one hand, in an event-history analysis of repeated migration (i.e. a second migration to Europe after a return in Senegal), Flahaux showed that unintended returned migrants (i.e. who had no intention of returning when they arrived in Europe) are significantly more likely to move back to Europe than those who originally had a return project. On the other hand, in his study of pathways into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in Europe, Vickstrom (2014) showed the cumulative nature of entering Europe with no visa: migrants who had a prior experience of illegal entry (and so were at risk of being deported) are more likely to follow this irregular path of entry than those who had no migration experience at all. All in all, studies of Senegalese migration confirm that "managed" returns certainly have little effect on *net* migration in Europe. But, overall, taking account of both "managed" and "spontaneous" movements, do trends in return confirm the above-mentioned "reverse-flow substitution" hypothesis?

If the hypothesis is valid, we should observe a decrease in the propensity to return from Europe over time as policies are tightened. At first sight, this is not confirmed by the MAFE household data: trends

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[6] For a discussion on the potential effects of distance on migration determinants, see Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. (2014).

[7] Results on the determinants of return point in the same direction as they show that undocumented Senegalese migrants are not more likely to return that those living in Europe with proper documents (see chapter 4).

in return, as measured from the migratory behaviour of household heads' children, show a stall rather than a decline since 1975 (Figure 2). In fact, variations over time are too tiny to comment on with statistical confidence. Analyses are here hampered by the small sample size. Unfortunately, and as in most other countries in the world (Beauchemin 2014), there are – as far as we know – no other statistical source that would allow us to measure how return migration to Senegal has evolved over time[8]. However, the MAFE project provides an alternative measurement that tends to confirm the "reverse-flow substitution effect" hypothesis.

In the MAFE biographic survey, migrants (whether living in Europe or back in Senegal) were asked how long they intended to stay at destination at the time of their arrival in each receiving country. The question was both retrospective and subjective and thus potentially subject to ex-post revision. Over the 1975-2008 period as a whole, a quarter of migrants going to France, Italy or Spain intended to go back home within ten years (Table 3). Although the majority envisaged staying longer (which does not mean permanently), this result reminds us that a significant proportion of migrants considered themselves as temporary migrants. A rich socio-anthropological literature has analyzed Senegalese migrants' strategies and shown how return is an intrinsic part of the departure project (Castagnone 2010). As mentioned in section 2.1, historical migration out of the Senegal River Valley was conceived as a circular movement and it seems that the new migration that developed out of other parts of Senegal also rests on a strong attachment to the home country. However, at the turn of the 21st century, socio-anthropologists pointed to a new attitude to return among communities of Wolof in Italy and of Tukolor and Soninke from the Senegal Valley in France (Sinatti, 2009; Sarr, 2010): return seems to be continually postponed as conditions in host countries make it increasingly difficult to fulfil hopes for economic success, which is a precondition for fulfilling family obligations and for a socially successful return home.

Our quantitative analyses of the MAFE data also show that intentions to return evolved over time. The proportion of migrants intending to return within 10 years shrank by half, starting at 38% in 1975-1990 to stabilize at around 20% in 1990-2000 (Table 3). To some extent, this decrease matches the trend towards tighter border control and tends to support the "reverse-flow substitution" hypothesis. In line with these results, Marie-Laurence Flahaux has shown in bivariate and multivariate analyses using the MAFE data that intentions to return also became less and less predictive of actual return over time: as immigration policies became more restrictive, Senegalese migrants in Europe revised their initial intention to return, postponing if not cancelling it (Flahaux 2015).

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[8] However, it has been established that return to Senegal is a significant phenomenon. According to the Push-Pull data (1997-1998), more than a quarter of the households surveyed in the capital city (27%) contained at least one returnee. These returnees may be involved in circular migration: barely 50% of them declared that they had return for good, and more returnees than non-migrants declare an intention to move abroad (Robin, Lalou et al. 1999). Furthermore, 30% of migrants living abroad were reported (by the interviewed household heads) to intend to return, this figure being higher among the more recent migrants and among those currently in Italy (compared to those in France or in Senegal's neighboring countries, no results being available for Spain). In addition, 16% were said to be indecisive whether to come back or stay abroad. These figures are not representative of the Dakar region, but they illustrate quite well that return migration was a significant phenomenon at the end of the 1990s in the capital city.

Figure 2. Return trends. Probability of returning within 10 years of first departure, by destination (1975-2008).

Data: MAFE-Senegal, Household data, 2008
Note: weighted figures, 90% confidence intervals.
Population: Children of heads of households, aged 18-39, who left Senegal aged 18 or over.
Interpretation: Each bar represents those who returned to Senegal as a proportion of those who left Senegal for the first time during the observed period.

Table 3. Intentions of stay, on first arrival in the MAFE countries, by period of first arrival - % of migrants.

Origin and destination	Intended duration of stay	Period of first arrival in country			
		1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2007	1975-2007
France, Italy, Spain	Less than 3 years	14	10	6	9
	3 to 9 years	24	12	12	15
	10 years and over	62	78	82	76
	N	162	244	297	703

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe and Senegal, 2008
Population: Sample includes first long stay in a destination country of all migrants still living in a MAFE country or back in Senegal. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later.
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. People intending to stay permanently are included in the category '10 years and over'.
Statistical significance: differences across periods are significant (F-test, $p<0.01$).

3. A new geography of migration flows

3.1. Africa vs. Europe

MAFE results in section 2 have shown clearly that international migration in Dakar shows a strong attraction to Europe. But what is observed in the capital city is not really representative of the migration geography of the whole country. According to the 2002 Census, 61% of all recent migrants declared by households of the capital city were living in Europe, against 48% of all migrants reported for the whole of Senegal (Table 1). Migration to North America is even more overrepresented in Dakar compared to the rest of the country (13% against 7%, Table 1). This overrepresentation of Western destinations among migrants from Dakar was already noticeable in 1992, when recent migrants from the capital were already a majority of those living in Europe (57%, Table 1). Several

factors may explain this feature. It may result from a higher exposure to the Western world[9] and also from a greater ability to migrate there. Households in Dakar are wealthier, allowing for more costly migration. Individuals are also more educated, which can enhance their migration project. The centralization of higher education institutions in the capital also makes international migration for study purposes more likely from there than from other parts of the country[10]. Finally, the fact that migrants from Dakar are less oriented towards other African destinations is also linked to the establishment of social networks. Much of the migration to Africa is to neighbouring countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, or Gambia (Table 2); these flows are actually local flows within ethnic regions split by national borders a long way from Dakar. Flows to other African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire or Gabon first developed in rural regions, especially the Senegal River Valley, so that most migrants' networks are not located in the capital (Bredeloup 2007). Historically lower than in the rest of the country, migration from the capital city to these African destinations declined in the 1990s (Table 4), reflecting changing reception contexts. Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, hit by economic decline, adopted policies in favour of their own citizens, and a xenophobic social ambience discouraged immigration and even encouraged return (Ba 1997; Blion and Bredeloup 1997).

In contrast, for Senegal as a whole, international migration remained predominantly oriented towards African countries, with the number of Senegalese migrants in Africa being approximately twice the number of those in Western destinations (Table 1). However, even at the national level Senegalese migration has become increasingly European over time: in 1960 migrants in Western countries were about 15,000 times less numerous than migrants in Africa, while by 2000 they were "only" two times less numerous (Table 1). As can be seen in the same table, this dramatic change is not due to the decline in the number of migrants in Africa. It rather reflects the diversification of Senegalese migration and the rise of extra-continental mobility. The devaluation of the CFA franc (which doubled the value of the French franc) probably played a significant role in this renewed attraction of European destinations.

3.2. New destinations in the Western world

As the former metropolis of Senegal, France is the historical destination of Senegalese migrants in Europe. New destinations emerged at the end of the 20th century, however. Table 2 shows that Italy became a major destination in the 1980s, with its number of Senegalese migrants growing from about 4,000 in 1980 to more than 40,000 in 1990 (i.e. before the mass regularizations of the 1990s). Figure 3 shows both that the Senegalese population continued to grow in Italy in the following decades and that Spain also became a major destination in the 1990s, reaching 34,000 in 2008.

Dakar was at the forefront of this diversification of migration flows to Europe and exemplifies the changed position of France. Table 4 presents the trend for the top 10 destinations of migrants reported in the MAFE household survey in Dakar. Until the 1990s, France was by far the top destination, receiving up to 39% of all migrants reported as having left in the 1990-1999 period. But over time, Italy surpassed it: attracting only 4% of all migrants in 1975-1989, it was the destination of a quarter of those who left Senegal in the 2000s (24% against 23% for France). The progress of Spain is also striking: absent from the top 10 destinations in 1975-1989, it ranked third after 2000. The first decade

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[9] This exposure also results from migrants' investments in the city. Tall (2008) suggests that massive (and thus visible) investments in real estate by migrants located in Europe contributed to the creation of a "culture of migration" that has increased emigration pressures.

[10] According to the 2002 Census, 19% of the recent migrants who left Dakar had gone to study, this proportion being only 10% at the national level (Baizan et al., 2013).

of the 21st century was also when new destinations outside Africa and Europe emerged, such as Saudi Arabia and the USA (Table 4).

This redistribution of migrants' geographical preferences reflects the evolution (alteration, closure or opening) of opportunities in destination areas. In Mediterranean countries, migrants responded to the need for manpower in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The United Stated appear as another good example of an opportunity opening up: the creation in 1990 of the Green Card Lottery, also known as the Diversity Immigrant Visa program, which aims at providing permanent resident visas to natives of countries deemed to have low rates of immigration to the USA, certainly gave some momentum to Senegalese migration to North America (Thomas 2011). In contrast, as explained above, France exemplifies closure in matters of immigration policy.

Interestingly, the timing of the shift in destination rankings in Table 4 shows a lag in migrants adjusting their choice of destination to changing immigration rules[11]. While the tightening of migration policies in France started in the mid-1970s, it was only in the 1990s that new destinations emerged in Europe and France started to lose rank. At that time, Italy and Spain, the emerging destinations, followed France in its restrictive stance in most areas of migration regulation (Figure 4), and it was only in the following decade that new destinations outside Europe appeared among the top ten destinations.

Figure 3. Senegalese migrant stocks in France, Italy and Spain

Sources: Reproduced from Mezger (2012). United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD): France 1982, 1990; Spain 1990; Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques: France 1999, 2005, 2007; Istat: Italy 1992-2008; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigracin a partir de datos suministrados por Ministerio del Interior: Spain 1996-2008.
Definition : Senegalese migrants are defined as people born in Senegal.

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[11] For details on the methodology used to code policies in the ImPol database and on results interpretation, see Mezger (2012) and Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013). Vickstrom (2013, 2014) also provides a very detailed analysis of immigration policies in Spain, Italy and France.

Table 4. Top ten destinations from Senegal (1975-2007), by period – 1st migration

1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2007	
Country	% of migrants	Country	% of migrants	Country	% of migrants
France	29%	France	39%	Italy	24%
Côte d'Ivoire	12%	USA	13%	France	23%
Mauritania	12%	Italy	11%	Spain	12%
Gabon	8%	Côte d'Ivoire	8%	Mauritania	8%
Gambia	6%	Gabon	8%	Tunisia	4%
Mali	5%	Mali	5%	Gambia	4%
Italy	4%	Gambia	4%	USA	4%
USA	4%	Mauritania	3%	Morocco	3%
Morocco	4%	Spain	1%	Guinea	3%
China	3%	Algeria	1%	Saudi Arabia	3%
10 countries	87%	10 countries	94%	10 countries	88%
N	114	N	139	N	199
Source : MAFE-Senegal, Household survey, 2008					
Sample includes first migration of heads of households, their spouse(s) and their children, who left at age 18 or over in 1975 or later.					
Interpretation: 29% of migrants who left Senegal between 1975 and 1989 went first to France.					
Statistical significance: The percentage of migration to specific countries varies across periods (F-test). France (p<0.01), Italy (p<0.001), Mauritania (p<0.001), USA (p<0.001), Côte d'Ivoire (p<0.001), Spain (p<0.001), Gabon (p<0.01), Gambia (p>0.10), Mali (p>0.10), Morocco (p>0.10),					

Figure 4: Migration policy trends in France, Italy and Spain (with respect to Senegalese migration)

1. Immigration policy concerning irregular entry/residence

2. Short stay entry policy

3. Family reunification policy

4. Policies on entry for study

5. Work immigration policy

Variables included in the synthetic indicators:

• **Immigration policy concerning irregular entry/residence**: Readmission agreements signed/in force with Senegal; readmission agreements signed/in force with main transit countries; maximum duration of stay in administrative retention centres; extraordinary regularization (application process ongoing); permanent regularization

• **Short stay entry policy:** Tourist visa exemptions; motivation of visa refusals; economic resources requirements; housing requirements; health insurance requirements

• **Family reunification policy**: Legal protection of family reunification; duration of residence requirements; economic resources requirements; housing requirements; eligibility for family members in the ascending line; prohibition in case of polygamy; sequential reunification possible

• **Policies on entry for study**: Requirements in terms of admission; economic resources; health insurance

• **Work immigration policy**: Restrictions on work immigration (-1: national employment clause; 0: list of occupations, true quotas, or authorization necessary prior to entry; 0: more open conditions); access to the labour market for family members and students (during studies; after studies)

Source: IMPOL Database – Reproduced from Mezger and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013).

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3.3. Network effects in Europe

The time lag between the imposition of restrictions and a reorientation of destinations may be at least partly due to the pre-existence of social networks in established destinations. In the context of Senegalese migration as well as in other parts of the world (Massey et al. 2001; Liu 2013; Toma and Vause 2014), it is well established that migrants at destination exert a dual influence on would-be migrants. On one hand, migrants abroad contribute to the spread of a culture of migration in sending areas and so tend to arouse migration aspirations. Also, and more importantly regarding destination choices, they can help would-be migrants realize their migration project and integrate into the host society. These network effects are generally supposed to be especially strong in cases where migrants leave behind their close relatives (spouses, children): the right to family reunification, granted in all democracies (though with more or less liberal approaches), is a vector for continuing migration even when policies are restrictive (Boyd 1989). These social mechanisms ensuring continued migration are perceptible in many of the MAFE project's results.

When asked the reasons why they chosen their destination in Europe, 31 to 44% of migrants interviewed in France, Italy and Spain said they had social connections there (Table 5). Interestingly, the MAFE data allow us to distinguish different sorts of social ties. Going beyond previous research on networks, Toma and Vause (2014) and Liu (2013) have analyzed how the effects of networks on Senegalese out-migration vary depending on the network source (i.e. whether the connection abroad is a spouse, a former co-resident, a friend or a relative from the extended family). Network effects are gendered. Friendship appears to be more effective in stimulating male migration, while female migration is more driven by spousal relationships (Table 6). However, this does not mean that all migrants in Europe reunify. On the contrary, Senegalese migrants in Europe tend to live apart from their spouses and children for long periods (González-Ferrer et al. 2012; Baizán et al. 2014; Beauchemin et al. 2014)[12]. In fact, transnational family arrangements are quite common among Senegalese migrants, even more than among other African groups (see chapters 6 and 15).

Migrants' network configurations vary by destination country. MAFE results show, unsurprisingly, that the younger the history of Senegalese immigration in a given country, the weaker the social ties of new migrants in that country. Half of the Senegalese people who arrived in Spain, the newest destination country, knew nobody before migrating there. That proportion is significantly lower in older destinations such as Italy and, even more so, France (Table 6)[13]. Friendship[14] appears as the commonest type of social connection for migrants arriving in Italy, which is an intermediary destination in terms of migration history (neither the oldest destination nor the newest). And migrants with strong ties (a spouse and/or other relatives) are more than five times more numerous in France, the historical destination, than in Spain or Italy (Table 6).

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[12] In line with the view that reunification did not become a major channel of entry among Senegalese migrants, Toma and Vause (2013) have shown that the likelihood of female migration increased very moderately over time.

[13] Note that this type of pioneer migration is largely but not exclusively a male experience: 41% of male migrants in Europe declared they knew nobody, against 20% among women (Table 6). For a discussion of the autonomy of female migration, see Toma and Vause (2013). Migrants with primary education or none at all are also more likely to be pioneers (i.e. to know nobody at destination) than those who are more educated (43% against 29%), the latter relying more on kinship (siblings: 26% against 17%; other kin: 22% against 15%).

[14] Here friendship also probably refers to religious networks, which are especially important in Senegalese migration, especially among migrants from the Murid brotherhood (Ebin 1993; Bava 2003; Tall, 2007; Gabrielli, 2011).

The role of family reunification in the persistence of migration to France appears also in the motives for migration: overall, between 1975 and 2007, 29% of migrants arriving for the first time in France declared they came for family reasons, against only 13% and 6% respectively in Italy and Spain (Table 7)[15]. France's particular status for family migration also appears in its overrepresentation of migrants moving with children: they amount to 10% in France, five times the percentage in the two new Mediterranean destinations (Table 8)[16]. Student migration is another particularity of France as a destination country: 21% of Senegalese migrants in the former metropolis declared they migrated to study, whereas this motive is barely cited in Spain or Italy (Table 7). In this regard, social networks may play a role, but institutional factors are of tremendous importance: in Senegal, formal education is given in French and the education system is modelled on the French one. As a result, it is easier for Senegalese students to have their diplomas recognized in France than in other countries. Conversely, diplomas obtained in France are certainly better recognized back in Senegal than those from Spain or Italy. The role of language in the choice of destination is illustrated in Table 5.

Social networks also influence the routes migrants follow to reach Europe: trajectories are more likely to be direct when migrants have social connections at destination, and indirect when they don't. This hypothesis is supported by the MAFE data. Migrants in France, the country with the largest Senegalese community, arrived without transiting through another country much more often than migrants who headed to Italy and Spain (79%, against 69% and 64%, Table 9). It could be argued that this result reflects the fact that migrants in Spain and Italy more often entered as undocumented migrants and for that reason took complex routes through transit countries in Africa (9% to 11% of them declared having travelled with a smuggler, as against 3% of migrants to France, Table 8; see also section 4). However, although it is often believed that transit countries are only located in African countries (Castagnone 2011), it is interesting to note that France is also a transit country for migrants heading to Southern Europe: 15% of the Senegalese migrants in Italy entered Europe through France, the proportion being much lower in Spain (3%, Table 9). The interpretation is easy: when France became inhospitable to Sub-Saharan migrants, they continued to enter Europe through their former metropolis where they had social connections and then moved on to more open destinations. Importantly, few migrants arrived in France after a transit in Italy or Spain: only 4% came there after a stay in Spain, and Italy does not even appear among the top five routes to France[17]. This means that, at least until the time of our survey, Southern European countries had not become mere gateways to other, more restrictive, countries of the free-movement Shengen area: they were real destinations and not merely transit countries, because they were the places where migrants could find work (barely cited for France, work is a major motive for migration to Spain and Italy – see Table 5). Fears expressed by other European governments (especially in France) that massive regularization programs in Spain and Italy[18] would lead afterwards to the spread of migrants into the rest of the EU is not verified as far as Senegalese migrants are concerned. Migrants' answers about the reasons for their choice of destination suggest the same (Table 5): the facility of obtaining papers (i.e. a legal status in

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[15] As in many other contexts, family migration is a strongly gendered phenomenon: among the Senegalese interviewed in Europe, 42% of women declared family as a motive for migration, while the proportion was only 6% among men (Table 7).

[16] This type of migration is also highly gendered: 19% of female migrants in Europe travelled with a child or children, compared to 0% of male migrants (Table 8).

[17] These percentages were computed for the whole 1975-2007 period and so also reflect the migration routes observed in the more recent period (2000-2007), when Spain and Italy became more significant destinations of Senegalese migrants.

[18] These fears were notably expressed during the preparation of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008).

the host country) is not cited more often in countries were mass regularization programs were implemented (Spain and Italy) than in France where regularization has been more parsimonious[19].

Table 5. Motives of choice of destination among migrants currently living in France, Italy and Spain
First migration (long stay) after age 18 (1975-2007) - % of migrants

	Country			Gender	
	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Work	9	34	38	30	9
Family/friends	40	44	31	33	54
Studies	7	0	0	3	3
Transit	1	0	3	1	0
Facility / papers	10	6	11	10	7
Language	14	0	2	13	7
Qualities of country	11	11	12	4	13
Others	10	5	4	6	6
N	184	197	191	314	258
Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe, 2008 Population: Sample includes all migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later. Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. Interpretation: 9% of migrants in France declared the choice of their 1st destination was grounded in a work motive. Statistical significance: differences between countries are significant (Design-based F-test : p<0.001); Differences by gender are statistically significant for each country and for the three countries together (F-test, p<0.01).					

Table 6. Contacts in destination country prior to first arrival on migration to France, Italy and Spain (1975-2007),
% of migrants currently living in these countries

	Country			Gender	
Contact in destination country	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Nobody	26	36	51	41	20
Spouse/partner	28	8	7	4	48
Child/children	3	0	0	0	4
Mother/father	5	1	3	3	3
Brother/sister	27	19	16	21	24
Other parents	24	14	16	18	20
Friend	15	35	11	24	10
Other people	3	0	0	0	3
N	185	199	199	318	265
Source and Population: see Table 5 Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because respondents could mention several types of contact in the destination country. Interpretation: 26% of migrants in France declared they knew nobody when they first arrived in France.					

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[19] On regularization numbers, see note 4.

Table 7. Motives for migrating to France, Italy and Spain (1975-2007) among migrants currently living in these countries - % of migrants

Motives*	Country			Gender	
	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Work/living conditions	40	81	69	83	41
Family	29	6	13	6	42
Studies	21	1	0	13	17
Other	10	12	18	2	7
N	186	198	190	480	216

Source and Population: See Table 5
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because several motives could be mentioned.
* Illustration of most frequent migration motives
- Work/living conditions: Looking for work, found a job, business matters, wages too low, find a better life, economic problems etc.
- Family: Marriage, join spouse, join another family member, divorce etc.
- Studies: To study, internship
- Other: Health reasons, political reasons, adventure, etc.
Statistical significance: Differences in motives between countries are significant (Design-based F-test : p<0.001). Differences in percentages across gender were tested for each motive. Differences are statistically significant for work (p<0.01), family (p<0.01), studies (p<0.05) and Other (p<0.05).

Table 8. Co-travellers on the journey to the MAFE countries (first arrival), % of migrants currently living in these countries, by gender and country

Co-traveller at some point during the journey	Country			Gender	
	France	Italy	Spain	Male	Female
Alone during the whole travel	72	68	65	73	60
Spouse	3	2	0	1	5
Children	10	2	2	0	19
Other parents	6	6	7	4	3
Friend	4	17	24	15	3
Group (official, sport, music)	3	0	0	0	1
Smuggler	3	9	11	8	3
Other people	6	2	3	2	4
N	185	199	199	320	265

Source and Population: See Table 5
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. The sum of percentages may be greater than 100% because several types of co-traveller could be mentioned.
Statistical significance: For each type of co-traveller, differences were tested across countries (Design-based F-test).
Alone (ns); Spouse (p<0.10); Children (p<0.001); other parents (ns); friend (p<0.001); group (p<0.10); smuggler (ns); other people (ns). Differences in percentages across genders are significant for all categories (Design based F-test, p>0.1).

Table 9. Top five migration routes from Senegal to France, Italy and Spain (1975-2007), % of migrants

		Men	Women	All
Trajectory from Senegal to France	Senegal-France	75	85	79
	Senegal-Spain-France	4	4	4
	Senegal-Morocco-France	3	2	3
	Senegal-Maurit.-France	0	3	2
	Senegal-Mali-France	1	1	1
	N	99	86	185
Trajectory from Senegal to Italy	Senegal-Italy	66	90	69
	Senegal-France-Italy	16	6	15
	Senegal-Spain-Italy	4	3	4
	Senegal-Spain-France-Italy	3	0	3
	Senegal- Belgium-Italy	2	0	2
	N	121	78	199
Trajectory from Senegal to Spain	Senegal-Spain	60	86	64
	Senegal-Morocco-Spain	10	2	9
	Senegal-Italy-Spain	5	0	4
	Senegal-France-Spain	3	6	3
	Senegal-Italy-France-Spain	3	0	3
	N	98	101	199

Data: MAFE Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample includes short and long stays outside Senegal (for settlement or transit) before the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975), among migrants still living in host country at the time of the survey.
Note: Weighted percentages, unweighted numbers. Five most frequent categories are represented.

4. Frustrated desires of migration

Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, media coverage and political discourse on the "new", "growing", "mass" migration of desperate Africans to the El Dorado of Europe prompted experts to investigate irregular migration. The resulting studies suggest that, in response to more restrictive policies, routes have shifted, diversified and become more complex, with the "help" of the smuggling industry (Ba and Ndiaye 2008; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; de Haas 2008). Because irregular migration is, by definition, invisible in official statistics, most of this research relies on qualitative data. By contrast, one of the contributions of the MAFE project is to provide quantitative insights on these aspects of migration, which are usually overlooked.

The objective of this section is to study two aspects of what we call the "frustrated desires of migration". The first relates to uncompleted international migration projects captured through the practical steps that would-be migrants have undertaken without managing to actually leave Senegal for the country they targeted (at least until the time of the survey). The second aspect relates to the experience of migrants who entered illegally and/or became irregular migrants in Europe. The MAFE data provides very little information on a third aspect of "frustrated desires of migration", i.e. the experience of those who have been deported from Europe. We only know that migrants who declared "problems with papers" in Europe as a motive for return were a minority (see section 2.3). Unfortunately, the biographic MAFE data are also short on information about the experience of migrants who actually departed from Senegal but could not enter Europe, having either remained stuck in transit countries[20] or died on the way (Carling 2007).

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[20] Because of the way the samples were constructed, migrants who were in transit countries (for instance in Morocco) at the time of the survey are absent from the biographic MAFE survey. The Senegalese sample may

4.1. Aspiring migrants: now or never

A module of the MAFE biographic questionnaire was dedicated to migration "attempts", as the questionnaire called them. Rather than registering attempts to physically cross border(s), the module registered practical steps that would-be migrants had undertaken with the intention of moving out of Senegal. Such steps include saving money and asking for or obtaining the necessary travel documents such as passports, visas, accommodation certificates, registration at a university, authorization to leave[21], etc (Table 10). In short, the MAFE survey registered situation beyond mere intentions to move but short of actual migration attempts. With these data we can identify candidates for migration, "adding some objectivity to the measure of migration intention" (Mezger 2012).

One striking result is a surge, at the turn of the 21st century in the Dakar region, in the probability of undertaking steps towards migration: while in the 1970s and '80s only one Senegalese in ten took such steps, during the 2000s one Senegalese in three started trying to fulfil the conditions to leave (Figure 5). Since the question is retrospective, the proportions may be underestimated, especially for attempts that did not get far. Be this as it may, this trend is largely driven by aspirations to migrate to Europe: more than a quarter of the capital city population aged 18-40 took some kind of steps to prepare a departure towards Europe in the 2000s (Figure 5). In line with images conveyed by media at that time, Spain was then the first target of would-be migrants, followed by France and Italy (Table 11). In the same period, other destinations also started to be popular, especially the United States (Figure 5 and Table 11), which started their diversity programme (also known as the Green card lottery) in 1990 and became a desirable destination for students (Table 10).

On the contrary, steps taken to migrate to other African countries did not take off and remained remarkably low (Figure 5). Whatever the period since 1975, Africa is absent from the top 5 destinations (Table 11). This reflects the fact that migrating to Africa is much less costly both in terms of money and administrative procedures than migrating to Europe (or other destinations such as the US). Thanks to loose border controls (especially within West Africa), would-be migrants do not have to take many administrative steps before they can actually migrate. As a result, saving money is the main concern for those who aim to move within Africa (Table 10). The fact that trends in steps towards migration and actual migration to Africa are equally flat (Figure 1 and Figure 5) reflects the fact that the cost of intra-continental migration remained constant over time.

By contrast, the sharp increase in the probability of taking steps to move to Europe (Figure 5), while actual migration remained stable (Figure 1)[22], mirrors the rising cost of immigration to this part of the world. As immigration policies became more restrictive, would-be migrants had to take more and more steps to prepare for their (potential) departure. The surge in steps taken towards migrating to Europe could also partly signal a "now or never" logic whereby, in contexts of growing restrictions, would-be migrants accelerate their migration project to avoid the even stiffer policy measures that might arise in the future. In such contexts, even people with very vague migration projects may be tempted to take steps towards migration. This process was conceptualized by de Haas as an unintended

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include returnees who have failed in their journey to Europe (e.g. migrants who went to Morocco, stayed there, were unable to cross the sea and finally returned to Senegal). Numbers are likely to be tiny. These cases could however be investigated in future research.

[21] The need to obtain a permit to leave the country was abolished only in 1981.

[22] Trends have been computed using different sources. Figure 1 (actual migration) is based on a sub-sample of the household data (children of households heads in Dakar), whereas Figure 5 (steps to migration) is based on the biographic data collected among all individuals in Dakar. As they refer to the same periods, the same place (Dakar) and the same destinations, we believe that a comparison between these trends is acceptable.

"inter-temporal substitution effect" of restrictive policies (de Haas 2011). Mezger's longitudinal and multivariate analysis (2012, Chapter 3) of the determinants of attempts (i.e. steps to migration) suggests that such an effect is at play concerning Senegalese migration to Europe. She shows that fewer restrictions in policies to combat illegal immigration in France, Italy and Spain (as measured in the ImPol database (see Figure 4)) tend to diminish the probability of taking steps to out-migrate to Europe. Apparently paradoxical but already observed in the context of illegal Mexican migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997), this result actually suggests that when policies are getting more restrictive would-be migrants react by making greater efforts to migrate, in anticipation of even stricter policies in the future.

Table 10. Steps taken for emigration by would-be migrants in Dakar, by destination (1975-2007).
% of the population living in Dakar

	Africa	Europe	Other
Documents (asked for and/or obtained)	(14)	29	47
Green card lottery	(0)	1	22
University registration / scholarship (asked for and/or obtained))	(0)	5	14
Guarantee of care and provision (asked for and/or obtained)	(8)	25	19
Saved money	(49)	34	18
Other	(4)	15	24
N	11	128	42

Source: MAFE-Senegal, biographic survey in Senegal
Population: Sample includes people currently living in Senegal (regardless of their migration status), who were born in Senegal (attempts from 1975 onward).
Note: Weighted percentages, Unweighted numbers. Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets. The sum of percentages may be greater or less than 100%. Several steps can be mentioned or no steps may be mentioned in some cases.
Statistical significance: Differences in percentages across regions were tested for each category (F-test). University registration ($p<0.10$), guarantee ($p>0.10$), documents ($p<0.10$), saved money ($p>0.10$), Green card ($p<0.01$), Other ($p>0.10$).

Figure 5. Lifetime probability of taking steps towards migration
(between ages 18 and 40) from Senegal, by period (1975-2007)

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Senegal, 2008
Population: sample includes persons aged 18 to 40 living in Senegal at the time of the survey.
Interpretation: Lifetime probability indicates the likelihood of taking at least one step towards emigration in one's
lifetime, if the rate of steps taken by same age group for the period remains constant.

Table 11. Top five destinations of migration steps taken in Senegal (1975-2007), by period

1975-1989		1990-1999		2000-2007		1975-2007	
Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps	Country	% of steps
Italy	(33)	France	26	Spain	28	France	25
France	(33)	Spain	19	France	23	Spain	23
USA	(10)	Italy	18	Italy	16	Italy	18
Spain	(3)	USA	18	USA	11	USA	12
Germany	(2)	Germany	2	Germany	5	Germany	4
N	15		44		121		180

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Senegal, 2008
Population: sample includes individuals aged 18 and over living in Senegal at the time of the survey and who had taken steps
towards migrating from Senegal.
Statistical significance: Percentages computed for numbers lower than 30 are in brackets. Migration steps to specific countries
vary across periods (F-test). France ($p>0.10$), Italy ($p>0.10$), USA ($p>0.10$), Spain ($p<0.05$), Germany ($p>0.10$).

4.2.   Irregular migration

In addition to the three substitution effects already mentioned in this chapter as being able to limit
the effectiveness of restrictive migration policies (spatial, reverse-flow and inter-temporal), de
Haas (2011) also hypothesizes a "categorical substitution" effect, whereby entry channels that
become subject to growing restrictions are replaced by other channel(s). The growth in
undocumented migration could be related to this kind of substitution effect, with irregular
migration at least partly replacing regular migration. This hypothesis is in line with Vickstrom's
theory (2014) that "irregularity is legally produced by immigration policies". His empirical

analysis of laws, specifically in connection with Senegalese immigration in France, Italy and Spain, reminds us, for instance, that entering these countries *without* a visa was the legal norm until 1986 in France and 1990 in Italy. Before these dates, illegal entry was a non-existent concept: Senegalese migrants could enter Europe without any restriction (i.e. without having to apply for a visa prior to departure) and, in practice, were expected to regularize their administrative situation after finding a job (Vickstrom 2014).

The introduction of visa requirements prompted Senegalese migrants to adapt in two ways. Some were able to obtain the proper documents to migrate, thanks to various resources they could mobilize (such as networks at destination able to provide guarantees (see section 4.1). Unable to obtain a visa, others maintained their migration project, taking a route that avoided border control points in Europe and using smuggler services. Figure 6 shows how the percentage of migrants who travelled with a smuggler increased at the turn of the 21st century, when visas started to be required, from zero before 1990 to 8% in France, 11% in Spain and 17% in Italy after 2000. Table 12, showing the transport means used by migrants, provides an indirect measure of irregular migration. Although crossing by boat is not a totally new phenomenon among Senegalese migrants (see the historical role of seamen in section 2.1), it took new forms and a new order of magnitude in the early 21st century when migrants started to use *pateras* and pirogues to reach the Spanish coasts, especially the Canary Islands. Among Senegalese migrants who entered Spain between 2000 and 2007, up to a third used such a boat in his or her journey to Europe (Table 12)[23]. Despite its significance in Spain during this particular period, it is important to keep in mind that the vast majority of migrants travelled by plane: 97% of migrants in France in 2000-2007, 79% in Italy and still 70% in Spain (Table 12)[24]. That most migrants enter legally is confirmed by estimates in other studies (Triandafyllidou 2010).

Entering legally does not completely protect people from experiencing periods of irregularity, as there are "multiple paths into irregularity" (Vickstrom 2014): migrants may enter with a visa and remain in Europe after it has expired, thus becoming "overstayers"; others may experience "befallen irregularity" when their residence permit is not renewed[25]. Overstaying is quite a common path to irregularity. Vickstrom's multivariate analysis of the factors associated with the different pathways into irregularity has even shown that entering Italy or Spain with a visa is actually a strong predictor of irregularity.

Generally speaking, irregularity[26] was much more common in Spain and Italy than in France: between 1975 and 2007, up to 49% of Senegalese immigrants in Spain had no residence permit

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[23] This figure only concerns those who were actually able to immigrate to Spain: those who were apprehended and whose entry was refused are not counted here. Numbers of aliens refused in European countries (aggregates of all origin groups) can be consulted online in the MAFE Contextual Database.

[24] Plane was especially predominant among women: 97% of them used a plane, against 81% among men (all countries and periods combined). By contrast, the use of pirogues or pateras is almost exclusive to male migrants (10% against 1% for women). Means of transport also vary by education, with the more educated (secondary or higher education) being more likely to use a plane (94% against 75% for those with primary education or none at all) and less likely to use a pirogue or patera (1% against 16%).

[25] For further explanation of the institutional conditions explaining this type of change in administrative status, see Vickstrom (2014).

[26] In the rest of this section "irregular migrant", "irregularity" etc. should be taken to refer to those whose status had been irregular status at some point during their first year in the destination country.

during their first year of stay, compared to 38% in Italy and only 7% in France (Table 13)[27]. The proximity of Spain and Italy with the African continent facilitates illegal entry, but this is not the only reason. Irregularity is also linked to the structure of the national economy in these countries. Since residence permits can only be obtained by migrants who can produce a work contract, the high level of informality in the job market is part of the explanation (Vickstrom 2014). The length of Senegalese migration history in destination countries is also an explanatory factor: the pre-existence of a significant Senegalese community in France when more restrictive policies were implemented made it more likely that regular immigration would continue in the form of family reunification, a classic phenomenon that can also be considered a "categorical substitution" effect.

Although similar in their levels of irregular immigration compared to France, Spain and Italy differ in the characteristics of their undocumented migrants. The means of transport used by irregular migrants suggest that overstayers are more frequent in Italy than in Spain: those flying at least part of the way by plane and so subject to border control amount to 69% of the total in Italy and 53% in Spain (Table 14). On the other hand, irregular migrants crossing by sea at some point on their journey, whatever the type of boat, amount to 58% in Spain and only 24% in Italy (Table 14). That illegal border crossing was more common in Spain than in Italy is also reflected in migrants' itineraries. Routes involve African countries (other than Senegal) much more frequently among migrants in Spain than among their counterparts in Italy, for which intra-European mobility is more common (Table 15). Senegalese irregular migrants in Italy more commonly entered Europe through countries where they had social connections to help them migrate, such as France or (to a lesser extent) Belgium, before moving south and becoming overstayers.

Figure 6. Percentage of migrants who travelled with smugglers at some point on their journey to the MAFE countries (first arrival), among migrants currently living in these countries, by period of first arrival and by country.

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample includes all migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey. All migrants left Senegal at age 18 or over in 1975 or later.
Note: Weighted percentages, 90% confidence intervals.

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[27] On average, 30% of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain were "irregular", with higher proportions among men (37% against 12% among women) and the less educated (38% among those with primary education or less, against 24% for those with higher education).

Table 12. Means of transport used at least once on the journey to the current country of residence in the MAFE countries (first arrival), among those still in the country, by period of arrival. % of migrants.

Current residence	Means of transport used at least once during the journey	Period of first arrival in country			Significance	All
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2007	Difference across periods (F-test)	1975-2007
France	Plane	96	97	97	Ns	96
	Bus/train	5	12	9	P<0.10	7
	Car	9	6	9	Ns	8
	Boat	4	4	0	Ns	3
	Pirogue/Pateras	0	2	2	Ns	1
	N	55	56	74		185
Italy	Plane	64	82	79	p<0.10	78
	Bus/train	27	30	26	Ns	27
	Car	4	11	7	Ns	8
	Boat	22	12	11	Ns	13
	Pirogue/Pateras	5	2	3	Ns	3
	N	28	78	93		199
Spain	Plane	100	86	70	p<0.01	75
	Bus/train	21	17	17	Ns	17
	Car	8	13	0	p<0.01	3
	Boat	0	13	5	p<0.10	6
	Pirogue/Pateras	0	4	33	p<0.01	24
	N	19	68	112		199

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe, 2008
Population: Sample refers to the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975) among migrants still living in France, Italy or Spain.
Definition: Means of transportation include all means cited at least once during the journey from Senegal to the current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transport used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included.
Interpretation: The sum of percentages may be greater or less than 100%. Several means can be mentioned in some cases.
Statistical significance: Differences across periods in each country are reported in column 6. Differences in percentages across countries were tested for each means of transport for the "all" column (F-test). Plane (p<0.01), Bus/train (p<0.01), Car (ns, p=0.22), Boat (p<0.01), Pirogue/pateras (p<0.01).

Table 13. Legal status during the first year in France, Italy and Spain (1975-2007)
% of migrants currently living in these countries, by period

Current residence	Previous country	Period of arrival			
		1975-1989	1990-1999	2000-2007	1975-2007
France	Residence permit	69	93	88	8
	No residence permit	14	2	10	9
	No residence permit needed	14	6	1	7
	unknown	3	0	0	1
	N	55	56	74	185
Italy	Residence permit	39	60	56	55
	No residence permit	40	32	42	38
	No residence permit needed	21	4	0	5
	unknown	0	3	2	2
	N	28	78	93	199
Spain	Residence permit	57	66	42	49
	No residence permit	34	29	57	49
	No residence permit needed	4	1	0	1
	unknown	5	4	1	1
	N	19	68	112	199
Three countries	Residence permit	61	75	61	65
	No residence permit	22	19	38	28
	No residence permit needed	15	4	0	5
	unknown	3	2	1	2
	N	102	202	279	583

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic Survey in Europe
Population: Sample refers to migrants who arrived after 1975 in Europe at age 18 or over and were still living in France, Italy or Spain at the time of the survey.
Definition: Legal status is defined by the type of residence permit during the first year. No residence permit means the person has declared that at some point during the first year, he/she did not have a residence permit. A person may have had a visa that expired, and be classified in "no residence permit". "No residence permit" in the first year is not synonymous with illegal border-crossing.
Statistical significance (Design-based F-tests): for the three countries together, differences by period are significant ($p<0.01$). Differences across periods are significant in France ($p<0.01$), in Italy ($p<0.01$) and in Spain ($p<0.05$).

Table 14. Means of transport used at least once on the journey to Spain and Italy (first arrival)
% of "irregular migrants" (during the first year after arrival)

Means of transport used at least once during the journey	Italy	Spain
Plane	69	53
Bus/train	39	20
Car	13	1
Boat	16	8
Pirogue/pateras	8	50
N	63	73

Source: MAFE-Senegal, Biographic surveys in Spain and Italy.

Population: Migrants living in Spain and Italy at the time of the survey who had no stay permit during their first year of stay in these countries.

Population: Sample includes short and long stays outside Senegal (for installation or transit) before the first long stay in country, at age 18 or over (after 1975) among migrants still living in the country.

Definitions:

- "Irregular migrants" are those who declared they had no residence permit at some point during the year of their arrival. France is not included because of the small number of irregular migrants (N=17).
- Means of transport include all means used at least once during the journey from Senegal to their current country of residence (first arrival). Means of transport used to reach intermediate countries (for short or long stays) are also included.

Table 15. Top five routes of "irregular migrants" from Senegal to Italy and Spain (1975-2007). % of "irregular migrants"

Senegal to Italy		Senegal to Spain	
…-Italy	64	…-Spain	63
…- France-Italy	21	…-Morocco-Spain	11
…-Spain-Italy	2	…-France-Spain	4
…-Morocco-Spain--Italy	2	…-Gambia-Spain	4
…- Belgium-Italy	2	…-Gambia-Mauritania-Spain	4
N	69	N	74

Source, Population, Definitions: see Table 14 (Total Ns are different because of missing values).

Note: Only the five most frequent categories for the whole period are represented.

5. Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to analyze the changing patterns of Senegalese migration since 1975, i.e. since migrants began to be confronted with increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe and also, more recently, at a time when Senegalese were increasingly perceived as a vast flow of unwanted migrants sneaking illegally into Europe. Our results on departure trends have clearly shown that migration out of Senegal has not greatly increased since 1975 in relative terms. It is true that numbers of Senegalese migrants around the world have grown significantly over time, but as the population of Senegal also grew at the same time, the propensity to out-migrate remained constant. Even though Senegalese migration remains predominantly intra-continental, Europe has increasingly become an objective over recent decades. Western destinations are over-represented in Dakar compared to other parts of the country. In short, between 1975 and 2008, while France (the historic destination of Senegalese migrants outside Africa) officially decided to limit immigration, there was

neither a surge in out-migration (contrary to the widespread belief in an African invasion of Europe) nor the decline that might have been expected if restrictions had been effective.

In fact the MAFE results tend in many ways to support the hypothesis that the effectiveness of restrictive policies is hampered by a series of "substitution effects" (de Haas 2011).

(1) The decline in return intentions coupled with the fact that intentions became less predictive of actual return signals a "reverse-flow substitution" effect, whereby immigration restrictions actually discourage return migration and so weaken the impact of the new restrictions on net migration. This effect is not compensated for by managed returns.

(2) The changing geography of Senegalese destinations in Europe also attests to a "spatial substitution" effect: exposed to restrictive measures (implemented in times of economic recession), migrants head to new destinations with better economic opportunities and more open migration policies. MAFE results show that this reorientation happens with some lag, as social networks tend to insure the continuance of migration to former destinations, which can act as redistribution places; for instance, with France serving as a transit country for Senegalese migrants heading to Italy. The timing of Senegalese immigration to Spain and Italy also suggests that migrants were not primarily attracted by the generous regularization programs they implemented in the 1990s and 2000s (when the Senegalese communities had already significantly grown in these countries), but rather by the call for manpower.

(3) Another reason for the continuance of migration to Europe concerns two kinds of "categorical substitution" effects, whereby entry channels subject to restrictions are replaced by new ones. One, already quite well documented in the literature, concerns family reunification, which developed as a new channel of entry for Senegalese migrants when labour migration was stopped in France. The other "categorical substitution" effect observed in this chapter concerns the development of irregular migration in place of regular migration, when visas were introduced. The migrants' trajectories registered in the MAFE data were especially useful in showing the diversity of the pathways into irregularity and the inefficiency of border controls for preventing irregularity. Both kinds of channel substitution entail ripple effects, in that they tend to decrease return migration and thus to fuel the above mentioned "reverse-flow substitution" effect. On the one hand, family reunification is a factor for migrant settlement at destination (see Chapter 4). On the other hand, irregularity often encourages migrants to delay returning home (Flahaux et al. 2014; Vickstrom 2014).

(4) Finally, the trend towards ever more restrictive policies in all European countries creates an "inter-temporal substitution" effect, whereby would-be migrants anticipate further restrictions and increasing costs of migration and so accelerate their migration project. The sharp increase in steps towards migration taken by people living in Dakar at a time of growing restrictions is an indication of this substitution effect. During the same period, the development of a culture of migration among Senegalese youth, in which travelling to Europe became a sort of initiation rite including painful ordeals (as illustrated by the popular motto "Barça ou Barszakh" which could be translated in "Barcelona or Die"), also indicates that more restrictions lead to more migration aspirations.

The results presented in this chapter cannot be considered a rigorous assessment of migration policies. They do however converge very firmly towards the idea that the increasingly restrictive

policies in Europe were met with a stream of unintended effects. Lastly, the fact that Europe was not invaded by hordes of African migrants when its borders were open, i.e. when entering Europe was not conditional on prior possession of a visa, also questions the rationale for strict border control.

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